INTRODUCTION
The label 'defences' can be used to describe a range of excusing or justificatory answers to a criminal charge, or as 'grounds for excluding criminal responsibility', according to Article 31 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 1 Defences are often categorized as excuses or justifications, with a justification being a challenge as to whether the act was wrongful and an excuse involving acceptance that the act was wrongful but seeking to avoid attribution of criminal responsibility.
2 This chapter addresses defences to international crimes and is structured in two parts; the first considers those defences which have a counterpart in domestic criminal laws, such as duress, self-defence, mistake, or mental incapacity, and the second those accused intends to rely to establish the ground'. 7 The practice before the ad hoc international criminal tribunals reveals that defences, as strictly understood, have tended to play a more marginal role for an accused seeking exoneration, than challenges on jurisdictional grounds or to the proof of the legal elements of offences. Chamber found that Vladmi Kovačević did not 'have the capacity to enter a plea and to stand trial, without prejudice to any future criminal proceedings against him should his mental condition change'. 9 Prior to his being transferred to the Hague, the accused had been confined to a psychiatric institution in Serbia. 10 An accused capable of standing trial and who seeks to raise a defence of mental incapacity would need to contend with the presumption of sanity. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber observed regarding this ground for excluding criminal responsibility: 'This is a defence in the true sense, in that the defendant bears the onus of establishing itthat, more probably than not, at the time of the offence he was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of his act or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong'.
11
The Chamber noted that a successful plea is a complete defence leading to an acquittal. 12 At the ad hoc tribunals, the burden of proving this defence lies with the accused, with the standard of proof required being 'on the balance of probabilities', while at the ICC, it is unclear as yet where the burden of such proof will lie.
In comparison with mental incapacity, an individual who argues they were of diminished mental capacity at the time of the offences might not evade conviction, but could receive a mitigated sentence. 13 While mental incapacity will destroy an accused's ability to appreciate the unlawfulness of their conduct or to control it so as to conform with the law, a diminished mental capacity is seen to impair that ability.
14 Before the International Criminal Court, a 'substantially diminished mental capacity' is considered to fall short of being a ground for excluding criminal responsibility, but should be taken into account as a mitigating factor in sentencing. 15 The ICTY Rules 'although the commission of these crimes transcends acceptable limits, albeit in defending a cause that is palpably just and defendable, such as acting in defence of constitutionality by engaging in a struggle or a fight that was geared towards the restoration of the ousted democratically elected Government of President Kabbah, it certainly, in such circumstances, constitutes a mitigating circumstance in favour of the two Accused Persons'.
27
However, the Appeals Chamber ruled that '"just cause" as a motive for the purposes of sentencing should not be considered as a defence against criminal liability' or as a mitigating factor.
28
The extent to which force can be used to defend property has proved a controversial using force to protect 'property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission' has also been criticized. It has been described as 'a disturbing compromise'.
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According to the ICTY, this aspect of self-defence 'takes into account the principle of military necessity', 31 although this may not be in line with the meaning of military necessary, as described below. Self-defence may not arise as an issue before the International Criminal Court if practice to date is considered; this the ground for excluding criminal responsibility has not featured prominently in international proceedings, 32 perhaps owing to the nature of the crimes and the seniority of the accused with whom international criminal tribunals are concerned.
Duress and Necessity
International criminal law, like its domestic counterparts, pays heed to the fact that individuals may be forced against their will to commit crimes and accordingly allows for a defence of either duress or necessity in such circumstances. Where a threat of harm is made against an individual by other persons then resort may be made to a defence of duress, and where the harm arises from natural occurrences beyond an individual's control, then a defence of necessity might arise. 33 Duress has generated much scholarship and little in the way of practice at the international criminal deemed proportionate 'to a crime directed at the whole of humanity'. 37 Although the majority did accept that duress could be a mitigating factor in sentencing, 38 it is the minority opinion in Erdemović that will likely provide guidance for any future considerations of the defence. Judge Cassese set out the following conditions:
'i. the act charged was done under an immediate threat of severe and irreparable harm to life or limb;
ii. there was no adequate means of averting such evil;
iii. the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened (this would, for example, occur in case of killing in order to avert an assault). In other words, in order not to be disproportionate, the crime committed under duress must be, on balance, the lesser of two evils;
iv. the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily brought about by the person coerced'.
39
The Erdemović case also demonstrates that in the context of international crimes, a defence of duress will often arise in connection with superior orders, where an individual soldier, for example, was ordered to commit offences under a threat to their life. Superior orders is a distinct defence and is discussed further below.
Mistake of fact and mistake of law
The Rome Statute allows mistakes of fact or law as defences where the mistakes are such as to prevent the accused from having formulated the necessary mens rea for the offence. Article 32 of the instrument specifies that:
'1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime. 
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The Hartmann contempt trial before the ICTY was one of the rare occasions when mistake was raised as a defence before international criminal tribunals, although of course the accused in that instance was not charged with an international crime.
Defence argued that the accused was not aware of the illegality of her conduct and that she acted under a reasonable belief that the information she disclosed was public. 42 The Chamber did not accept that the accused was reasonably mistaken in fact regarding the confidential material and as regards the mistake of law defence, it noted 'that a person's misunderstanding of the law does not, in itself, excuse a 'Raise the existence of an alibi, in which case the notification shall specify the place or places at which the accused claims to have been present at the time of the alleged crime and the names of witnesses and any other evidence upon which the accused intends to rely to establish the alibi'.
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The possible existence of an alibi is an issue of fact that will need to be disproved by the Prosecution in order to establish the presence of an accused at the location of the offence's commission. Alibi is more relevant for those persons accused of directly participating in the commission of crimes, as military or civilian superiors or those who may have ordered, induced or aided and abetted in the carrying out of an offence need not be present at the scene for criminal liability to arise. That being said, alibi may be raised with regard to presence at particular meeting where an agreement was made to pursue a course of action involving aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. 43 Ibid., paras. 
Consent
The absence of consent by a victim is generally considered as an element of certain crimes, although the claimed presence of consent might sometimes be raised as a defence. Lack of consent is a specific element for the war crimes of pillage, enforced sterilization, rape, sexual violence and enforced prostitution in the Rome Statute. 
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This approach to the issue of consent is seen as 'just the mirror image of the definition of rape'. 62 Moreover, it has been contended that 'sexual violence that qualifies as genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime, occurs under circumstances that are inherently coercive and negate any possibility of genuine consent'. 63 Consent, of course, can never be a defence to murder and would not be relevant for many international crimes, although where it might arise, its classification as either a defence or an element of the crime would impact on the burden of proof.
64

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEFENCES Superior Orders
The highly regimented structure of military forces, where lawful orders should be met with 'prompt, immediate, and unhesitating obedience', 65 has given rise to a defence of superior orders, whereby an accused claims that they acted on the basis of orders from a superior which as a subordinate they were bound to follow. International criminal law has evolved in its treatment of the defence, from its rejection as an absolute defence at Nuremberg, to a more nuanced approach under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 66 Article 8 of Nuremberg Charter established the standard approach:
'The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires'.
This approach ruled out superior orders as a defence, and rendered it relevant only at the sentencing stage, although in finding Keitel guilty on all four counts, the Nuremberg Tribunal concluded that the defence of superior orders 'cannot be considered in mitigation where crimes as shocking and extensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without military excuse or justification'. 67 defence of superior orders beyond the context of mitigation. 68 The statutes of the contemporary ad hoc international criminal tribunals have included a provision on superior orders largely replicating the approach taken at Nuremberg. 69 However, according to Zahar and Sluiter, the practice is that despite the considerable academic commentary on superior orders, it is 'almost by definition not a live defence at the tribunals' given the seriousness of crimes charged and the seniority of the accused. 70 The limited consideration of the defence of superior orders at the ad hoc tribunals has taken place at the sentencing stage, and has usually been unsuccessful, as was the case in Erdemovic. This is a departure from the approach taken at Nuremberg and by the ad hoc tribunals, in that the defence is allowed in limited circumstances: only those under a duty to obey orders can raise the defence, it is limited to war crimes charges, and will succeed where it is proved that the individual did not know that the order was unlawful and the order itself was not manifestly unlawful. Antonio Cassese has contended that the provision is out of step with customary international law by treating war crimes differently from genocide and crimes against humanity in terms of manifest unlawfulness.
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Reprisals
The concept of reciprocity often cast a dark shadow over observance of the laws of armed conflict, 73 although according to the International Criminal for the Former Yugoslavia, '[t]he defining characteristic of modern international humanitarian law is…the obligation to uphold key tenets of this body of law regardless of the conduct of enemy combatants'. 74 Persons accused of international crimes have occasionally sought to raise a defence of tu quoque, claiming that similar acts were also carried out by their opponents, although such an argument has invariably been rejected and often serves more as a political denunciation of the relevant tribunal, rather than a genuine defence to criminal charges. 75 Until such a time as international criminal justice is applied evenly to all international crimes, then such claims of justification will continue to be made. 76 Defence arguments seeking to rely on reciprocity may gain some traction by resort to the doctrine of reprisals.
Reprisals are a somewhat anachronistic international law enforcement mechanism, and although largely of academic interest in the present day, with little actual reliance on the doctrine, reprisals have been invoked as a defence before the international tribunals recently 77 and cannot with certainty be ruled out as a defence to war crimes or even perhaps to the crime of aggression. The defence of reprisals was used frequently in the trials conducted after the Second World War as an attempt to justify conduct which would otherwise be viewed as being contrary to the laws of war. 78 The appeal of the defence is obvious, when one considers that belligerent reprisals are deliberate violations of the laws of war by a party to an armed conflict in response to the prior violation of those same laws by the opposing party, and for the purpose of forcing a return to observance of the law. 79 The Additional Protocol I added to this growing list by including, for example, the civilian population, objects indispensible to the survival of the civilian population and the natural environment, 84 although the attempt to include reprisal prohibitions applicable to non-international armed conflicts in Additional Protocol II proved unsuccessful. 85 A complete ban of belligerent reprisals has not yet been brought about, and while no State disputes the reprisal prohibitions in the Geneva Conventions, the rules in Additional Protocol I have not been agreed to by all States and doubts exist over the customary international law status of some of those provisions. 86 The laws applicable to internal armed conflicts are silent on the question of belligerent reprisals, although it is arguable that this concept does not apply outside of the context of inter-State conflict. 87 The defence of belligerent reprisal in the Allied trials after the Second World War yielded little if any success for those accused who sought to raise it, often because of the excessively disproportionate nature of the reprisals taken; in the notorious 'Ardeatine Cave' incident, ten prisoners were killed for each German policeman that had been killed in a partisan bomb attack. 88 The ICTY has discussed belligerent reprisals as a possible defence in its jurisprudence, holding somewhat controversially that the rule that protects civilians from being the target of reprisal action applies in all armed conflicts and that the rule in Additional Protocol I prohibiting reprisals against the civilian population is a rule of customary international law. 89 Where the law relating to belligerent reprisals is either contested or permissive, as is the case with reprisals against active combatants and military objects, recourse to the reprisal argument may act as a possible legitimate defence to a charge of war crimes. 90 The issue of reprisals as a defence had been addressed with some concern in the preparatory work leading to the adoption of the Rome Statute, 91 329-347. 102 Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(xiii). 103 Hampson, 'Military Necessity', p. 251.
